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The terrorist bombing of the Centen-nial Olympic Park in downtownAtlanta on July 27, 1996, represents
yet another incident in a pattern of terror-
ism taking place upon American citizens
and upon the representatives and institu-
tions of the government that serves them.
“Atlanta” will now be added to our collec-
tive memories and mentioned in muted
tones, along with a growing roll call that
includes TWA Flight 800,1 Dhahran, Okla-
homa City, the World Trade Center, Locker-
bie and Beirut.
In dealing with these heinous crimes, we
focus an enormous effort on identifying the
perpetrators — who they are and the
groups to which they belong. Now that
domestic terrorism has become a reality,
right-wing militias and radical Islamic
sects receive equal attention. The groups
have strange sounding names: Hezbollah,
Hamas, Viper and Freemen. They repre-
sent extremists of one kind or another,
with little stake in or love for American
society.
While United States governmental
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U.S. and Saudi military personnel survey the damage to the Khobar Towers near Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia. The facility was damaged by a terrorist bombing in June 1996.
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This article examines the nature of ter-
rorists and terrorist groups and predicts
the implications of future terrorists emerg-
ing as “criminal soldiers.” Opinions
expressed are the author’s and do not nec-
essarily reflect the policies or positions of
the Department of the Army or the Depart-
ment of Defense. — Editor
authorities attempt to identify who these
people are, another equally important con-
cern, what they are, is too often ignored. It
is imperative that the U.S. special-opera-
tions community not make this oversight.
Given the altered nature of the post-Cold
War security environment, asking the
question “What is a terrorist?” should
become fundamental in our attempts to
better understand the future. The answer
to that question will give the SOF commu-
nity insights that can lead to a critical re-
evaluation of its perceptions of terrorists
and of war-fighting in general.
Our current legal interpretations define
a terrorist as a criminal. This must be a
correct assumption, because such a person
violates our conventions concerning the
conduct of modern warfare. A terrorist is
not viewed as a traditional soldier because
he is not a representative of a nation-
state’s military forces. A terrorist does not
wear the distinctive uniform of a soldier,
and he views all targets, including women
and children, as legitimate. But the char-
acterization of a terrorist as both a crimi-
nal and a coward, echoed repeatedly by our
political and military leadership, may be
only partially true.
Advanced form of soldier
Like the Roman god Janus, a terrorist
also bears a second image: the image of an
advanced form of soldier. This is a soldier
who is not only non-Western, he is also
potentially post-Western in his war-fight-
ing orientation and in his level of technical
sophistication. For many, this perception
may be both surprising and sobering. It
reflects the brutal realities of today’s
changing world — a world where narcocar-
tels have gained the capacity to wage war
against legitimate governments, where
intrastate warfare has spread as nation-
states continue to implode over many
regions of the globe, and where competing
tribal and cultural groups select ethnic
cleansing as their preferred method of set-
tling disputes.
We may be able to accurately assess the
technical sophistication of a terrorist by
examining the following advanced war-
fighting components that help to define his
capabilities:
• Organic stealth. Because a terrorist
eschews the traditional symbols of a sol-
dier and does not operate within the
boundaries of the Western-defined battle-
field, he is almost invisible to detection.
And with his ability to blend into the civil-
ian populace of an urban environment, the
terrorist is a highly survivable military
asset, because what cannot be seen cannot
be killed. The war-fighting advantage that
is gained by the terrorist is no different
from one achieved by a high-technology
stealth fighter or bomber, but it is pur-
chased at a fraction of the cost.
• Precision engagement. While we in the
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High-technology munitions,
such as this Tomahawk
cruise missile, provide pre-
cision forms of attack. Ter-
rorists’ precision weapons
are purchased at a fraction
of the cost.
West use high-technology precision-guided
munitions, such as laser-guided bombs and
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, to
destroy our targets, terrorists have their
own forms of precision weaponry. A truck-
load of explosives detonated in front of a
building, inside a building, or in a parking
garage must be considered a precision form
of attack. Using a radio-controlled bomb in
a culvert over which a head-of-state’s
motorcade is traveling, or smuggling plas-
tic explosives inside the luggage of an
unsuspecting airline passenger represent
two other methods of precision engage-
ment. The fact that terrorist capabilities
can be purchased cheaply does not mean
that they are inferior to Western methods
of launching precision strikes.
• Information warfare. Terrorists are
extremely effective in conducting informa-
tion warfare. Their violent activities are
routinely far less significant than the
threat of further violence that the acts
themselves create. Within the greater con-
text of American society, the loss of TWA
Flight 800 to a possible act of terrorism,
while a monumental tragedy to the friends
and families of the citizens aboard, is irrel-
evant to our society’s continued function-
ing. However, because such an act intro-
duces the specter of further violence occur-
ring anywhere and anytime, “terror” is
generated in the minds of our citizens far
out of proportion to the terror caused by
the initial terrorist act. Thus, an event that
should be no more significant than a tacti-
cal-level operation is elevated into an event
of strategic significance.
• Environmental and resource conserva-
tion. Because terrorists engage in tactical
operations that assume strategic-level
importance, terrorists are able to accom-
plish more with lower expenditures of vio-
lence than traditional nation-states can.
Mass industrial armies waste huge
amounts of human and materiel resources
in the conduct of war, and in the process
they severely degrade the environments
within which they operate. Terrorist
groups are far more sophisticated in their
war-making approach. Rather than
destroying peoples, governments, armies
and the environment around them, the
terrorists use precision in attacking the
ideological and sociological bonds that
hold a society together.
• Internetted command and control.
Unlike conventional organizations, terror-
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A section of the fuselage
from TWA Flight 800 is trans-
ferred from a Navy recovery
ship. The plane’s explosion
has generated terror of
strategic significance.
ist groups organize themselves into small
cells. For the purposes of command and
control, these cells interact in a web-like
fashion. The internetted structure offers
terrorist groups distinct advantages over
conventional organizations that have more
traditional hierarchical structures. First,
terrorist groups tend to be highly entrepre-
neurial in nature, which allows them to
quickly adapt to changing “battlefield con-
ditions,” unlike the more rigid organiza-
tions they are opposing.
Second, terrorist groups are immune to a
decapitation attack, since no traditional
hierarchical leadership is needed to coordi-
nate their actions. Third, the destruction of
a single terrorist cell will have little effect
upon the rest of the network. Finally,
because we do not fully understand the
decision-making process of the network, we
may fail to recognize the terrorist network
in the traditional sense. As a result, acts of
terrorism may go unnoticed. In reality, the
current rash of church burnings in the
South may be the work of terrorists.
Although no conspiracy has been found,
the unrelated node that each burning rep-
resents may ultimately be recognized as
part of a more insidious scenario.
War-fighting implications
The emergence of a criminal soldier, one
who is more advanced in technology and
who possesses more war-fighting capacity
than the traditional soldier fielded by
nation-states, is cause for immense con-
cern. The war-making monopoly that is
unique to nation-states is, for now, the
underlying reason they are considered the
dominant form of modern political commu-
nity. But should that monopoly be shat-
tered, nation-states would eventually cease
to exist, in the same manner as did their
medieval and classical predecessors.
Besides its impact on the nation-state,
the emergence of a criminal soldier would
alter our perceptions of war and of terror-
ism. First, we would have to rethink our
basic definitions of terrorism. The presence
of an advanced form of soldier, incompati-
ble with the institutions and the ethical
system of modern Western civilization,
would mean that war as we understand it
is changing. Naturally, our perceptions of
terrorist attacks upon our nation would
also have to shift. No longer would terror-
ist attacks be viewed as unrelated criminal
incidents; rather, they might be perceived
as the opening battles in a global struggle
over humanity’s future social and political
organization. This would be a struggle not
to determine a victorious nation-state or
coalition, but to determine the social and
political structure that would succeed the
nation-state.
Second, we would have to re-examine our
perceptions concerning state-sponsored ter-
rorism. Viewed from our new perspective,
terrorist organizations would likely repre-
sent an advanced form of mercenary group,
one not representative of the minor groups
that have existed during the last few cen-
turies of history. The new terrorist groups
would have parallels to those mercenary
companies that dominated warfare during
the early modern European era.
The less-technical explosive devices and
the small arms employed by early terrorist
groups are now giving way to advanced
munitions, precision-guided missiles and
computer viruses. The 1995 Sarin nerve-
gas attack in the Tokyo subway, while it
was not undertaken by a state-sponsored
group, has shown that given sufficient
funding, many of these groups may soon be
capable of fielding weapons of mass
destruction.
Third, we can expect the distinction
between crime and war to become blurred
as an outcome of the development of this
new form of soldier. State-sponsored ter-
rorism in the late 1960s initially broke
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The war-making monopoly that is unique to
nation-states is, for now, the underlying reason
they are considered the dominant form of mod-
ern political community. But should that 
monopoly be shattered, nation-states would
eventually cease to exist, in the same manner as
did their medieval and classical predecessors.
down this barrier. Since that time, the dis-
tinction has been further eroded by non-
national groups (such as narcocartels, reli-
gious sects, and ethnic clans) that engage
in private wars against nation-states. In
some failed nation-states, it is already
impossible to distinguish between the
criminal activities and the war-making
activities of local warlords and regional
groups.
Conclusion
The emergence of the terrorist as a crim-
inal soldier is likely to have profound
effects upon future American society and
government. Some of those effects are
apparent today, now that the war over
future social organization, already being
waged across much of the globe, is begin-
ning to take place on American soil. Direct
social costs can be measured by our citi-
zens who have been killed or maimed, our
burned-out federal buildings, our loss of
productivity resulting from communication
and transportation disruptions, and our
resource expenditures for counterterror-
ism, such as the $227 million to protect the
Olympic Games in Atlanta.
Indirect social costs will be difficult to
calculate, but in the long term they may be
more debilitating. They represent the ero-
sion of immaterial goods such as the sta-
bility of our social institutions, the trust
between our government and its citizens,
and the basic psychological health of our
people. Further, new debates can be expect-
ed to arise over the rights of citizens vs. the
need for new security measures. While
such measures will better protect our peo-
ple, they are bound to infringe upon the
very rights that we so cherish.
By necessity, the role of special-opera-
tions forces in combating terrorism will
increase. Because terrorists represent an
advanced form of soldier, our conventional
forces will be ineffective against them.
Only by fielding our own advanced form of
soldier, supported by an array of emerging
technologies, will our nation have the capa-
bility to defeat this enemy.
In the future, we should not be surprised
if the U.S. Special Operations Command is
increasingly called upon to respond to inci-
dents of domestic terrorism, to shield our
foreign bases from terrorist attack, and to
engage in the war against drug cartels.
During times of uncertainty, such as those
we now face, we will increasingly place the
burden of our country’s defense upon our
elite troops. We will have no choice, for in
the battle to determine the future social
and political structure of humanity, second
best is unthinkable.
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Notes:
1 Even if the destruction of TWA Flight 800 was due
to mechanical failure, the psychic damage has already
been done.
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